However, his belief that q may be rational (even when he does not think it is) in the objective sense because it is the logical consequence of other beliefs the arguer may have, though not of the proposition that the arguer takes it to follow from, viz., p. However, we can certainly say that when q is subjectively/doxastically justified by p, this can be glossed as belief that q causally depending on belief that p, without it being the case objectively that the truth of q follows from the truth of p, although the arguer must think that it does, at least as long as he takes his believing that q to be rational.
What I want to avoid including are certain kinds of state-given reasons for belief-such as it being useful to have such a belief-that might crawl in when we start to talk about justifying a belief in contrast to justifying what is believed, i.e., the propositional object of the belief. I don’t think it matters which is used here.
(1991), ‘Modeling rational agents within a BDI-architecture’, in Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR’91), pp. 473–484.Another term that often gets used here in place of subjective justification is doxastic justification.
(2007), ‘Coherence of laws’, UNSW Computer Science and Engineering Technical Report, Number: UNSW-CSE-TR-0719, October 2007. (2003), ‘The coherence of theories’, in Proceedings of the 18th Joint International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI03, Acapulco, Mexico, August 2003. (1998), ‘Coherence measure based on average use of formulas’, in Proceedings of the Fifth Pacific Rim Conference on Artificial Intelligence, LNCS, vol. 1531, Springer Verlag, pp. 553–564. (2001), The Universe in a Nutshell, Bantam Books, New York. (1988), Knowledge In Flux, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. (1980), The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. (1953), ‘On axiomatizability within a system’, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 18: 30–32.
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